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2 New work-time regimes 
The rise and fall of Kaduna Textiles Ltd 
We want good workers, because Kaduna Textiles is a place where people are 
expected to work hard. We make no apology for that, in fact we are proud of it, 
but do see to it that conditions are good and that there is a proper reward for work 
done. We want that reward to be as high as possible. 
Kaduna Textiles Ltd Employee’s Handbook 
The opening of the Kaduna Textiles Ltd (KTL) mill on 22 November 
1957 was a significant event as it reflected beginning efforts to industrialize the 
North and hence was received with much fanfare (Andrae and Beckman 1999; 
David Whitehead & Sons 1973).1 This mill represented the combined efforts of 
northern Nigerian political leaders, including Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna 
of Sokoto, and the Premier of the Northern Region, along with officials from 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Northern Region Development 
Corporation, as well as the management of the British textile manufacturing 
firm, David Whitehead & Sons, and British colonial administrators (Maiwada 
and Renne 2013; Onyeiwu 1997; Waziri et al. 2020). 
Yet by December 2002, Kaduna Textile Ltd had closed. There were several
reasons for its closure. However, the chapter begins with the optimism displayed
at its opening, for the Kaduna Textiles Ltd (KTL) mill served as a model for future
industrial development of northern Nigeria. It first describes the establishment
and growth of textile manufacturing at KTL—under the administrative leader-
ship of the Northern Region Development Corporation and David Whitehead
& Sons officials. It continues with a discussion of labor migration to Kaduna and
specifically, how family and ethnic connections as well as the “push” of western
education associated with their religious backgrounds led many KTL workers
to seek employment at the mill (Andrae and Beckman 1999; Hinchliffe 1973;
Medugbon 1976). It then considers the hiring process, training, and incentives
of KTL mill workers as described by former KTL workers, who emphasized mill
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work is explained in the Kaduna Textile Ltd Employee’s Handbook, which those
who were hired received: 
The Company therefore aims at recruiting, training and retaining a body 
of employees who are efficient in their work and enabling each employee 
to make to this joint effort the fullest contribution of which he is capable. 
Interviews with former KTL mill workers further clarify management strate-
gies through their experiences of the promotion process and pay levels. Once 
hired, mill officials were concerned with retaining workers through a range of 
incentives such as access to the mill clinics and “certificates of long service,” 
described in the KTL Employee’s Handbook and by former mill employees. 
The selection of workers with some western education and their retention 
through various incentives relates to the other part of the worker-management 
equation, namely that KTL was “a place where people are expected to work 
hard.” This hard work reflected a shift to industrial production and to a par-
ticular equation of time and money, noted by E.P. Thompson (1967: 61): 
Those who are employed experience a distinction between their employer’s
time and their “own” time.And the employer must use the time of his labour,
and see it is not wasted: not the task but the value of time when reduced to
money is dominant.Time is now currency: it is not passed but spent. 
Thus, new workers at KTL were trained for the specific work at the mill—for 
example, as operators of looms, and of cotton carding and spinning machines— 
but also in attending to time and to schedules of work. While most workers 
had been exposed through primary school attendance to a different configura-
tion of time as compared to agricultural work in their villages, which relied 
on the sun and the seasons to organize labor, mill routines were even more 
standardized. The presence of clocks, the sounding of sirens, and the use of 
punch-cards reinforced the textile mill’s particular work-time regime. 
However, despite the dedication of many mill workers and their adherence 
to mill rules, when the KTL mill ended operations in 2002, they were not 
paid their negotiated gratuities. The final section of the chapter considers the 
reasons for the Kaduna Textiles Ltd mill’s closing and its effect on workers’ 
time. Kaduna Textiles Ltd had several problems associated with production, 
which the KTL management attempted to address through various means of 
cost reduction. These included cutting back its labor force, union negotiations, 
and accommodation to workers’ informal resistance, which enabled the mill 
to continue operations until it could no longer do so. Workers’ experience 
of time after the mill closed changed as their urban experience of time was 
no longer equated with money and abundant food, but rather with futility, 
poverty, and hunger. Yet the mill’s decline and this new regime of time could 
hardly have been foreseen during the optimistic days of its opening and work-
ers’ pride in their achievement as employees of KTL. 
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The beginnings of the textile industry in Kaduna 
The political context of the mill’s opening in the final years of colonial rule in 
Nigeria reflected a major shift in British manufacturers’ and colonial officials’ 
views on manufacturing in the country. Prior to the mill’s opening, there were 
no large modern textile mills set up in Nigeria, reflecting the British colonial 
policy of extracting raw materials from its colony to be used in manufacturing 
in the UK, with the subsequent textiles to be sold by agents of British trading 
firms in Nigeria (Johnson 1974). However, by the 1950s, British textile manu-
facturers began to see the advantages of manufacturing closer to the source of 
its raw materials—cotton, and its customers—Nigerian consumers. Also, new 
shipping and rail services to Kaduna made the transport of equipment and 
building materials feasible. Thus, in 1954, following Nigerian inquiries, Mr. 
J. C. Whittaker, the co-director of David Whitehead & Sons, established the 
David Whitehead & Sons Overseas Liaison Office to accommodate these goals 
(Hartley 2012; Maiwada and Renne 2013; Onyeiwu 1997). 
Yet the earlier anti-manufacturing policy had consequences for the build-
ing and running of a large textile mill; Nigerian officials and workers had no 
experience or training in the operation of such an enterprise.2 Thus, on the 
Nigerian side, Northern Nigerian officials were interested in partnering with a 
textile manufacturing firm that could provide textile technology and expertise. 
Sir Ahmadu Bello, who was the Premier of the Northern Region, was a major 
force behind industrial development in northern Nigeria (Paden 1986: 265). 
He became interested in the British manufacturing firm, David Whitehead 
& Sons Ltd, possibly as a consequence of a visit to southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) where he had seen the David Whitehead & Sons mill, which 
the company had built there—its first in Africa (Interview: N. Rutherford, 
2 March 2012, Minchinhampton). In March 1955, the Northern Regional 
Government invited David Whitehead officials to establish a textile mill in 
Kaduna, in collaboration with the Northern Region Marketing Board and the 
Northern Region Development Corporation. Officials at David Whitehead 
& Sons also saw the advantages of citing a mill in Kaduna. In April 1955, 
Ahmadu Bello, officials from the NRDC, the Northern Region Marketing 
Board, and David Whitehead & Sons met in Rawtenstall, Lancashire, UK, 
to discuss the details of becoming partners in a textile manufacturing plant 
in Northern Nigeria (Maiwada and Renne 2013: 175). An agreement was 
subsequently negotiated to provide construction plans and equipment, as well 
as training staff, which was signed in Rawtenstall on 7 September 1955, with 
Ahmadu Bello and Alhaji Aliyu, Turakin Zazzau (the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, later Director of the Northern Region Development Corporation), 
other NRMB and NRDC board members, and officials of David Whitehead 
& Sons in attendance. 
Construction of the steel and concrete mill began in early 1956, under con-
tract with the UK firm, Taylor Woodrow (West Africa) Ltd, with prefabricated 
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On 7 March 1956, Ahmadu Bello laid the foundation stone in a ceremony 
attended by David Whitehead & Sons personnel (Maiwada and Renne 2013). 
Construction continued while reconditioned spinning equipment (13,608 
spinning spindles), new Barber Colman winding and beaming equipment, and 
288 new S-type Northrop automatic looms were shipped from the UK, and 
were later installed (David Whitehead & Sons 1973). By November 1957, the 
No. 1 Kaduna Textiles Ltd mill was ready to begin production following the 
mill’s official opening. 
The mill’s opening ceremony 
Many dignitaries attended the mill’s opening on 22 November 1957. Colonial 
government officials as well as personnel from David Whitehead & Sons and 
the Premier’s Office spent much time in preparing for this event (Kaduna 
Textiles Ltd 1957). A special brochure was commissioned from the British 
public relations firm, H. & B. Rose, in August 1957, which included a for-
ward by Sir Ahmadu Bello and a brief history of David Whitehead & Sons’ 
involvement in the construction of the mill, along with many illustrations 
(Maiwada and Renne 2013: 176). The opening, which Mary, Princess Royal 
and Countess of Harewood, was scheduled to attend, was carefully managed 
by British colonial officials in the Ministry of Trade and Industry. These offi-
cials developed scheduling, parking, and lists of invitees, many of whom were 
from the major foreign mercantile firms (e.g., John Holt, UAC, and Paterson 
Zochonis) working in Nigeria. Guests were taken around the offices and 
mill and were given brief explanations of the textile manufacturing processes 
(Kaduna Textiles Ltd 1957; Figure 2.1). 
The mill began operation in November 1957, producing unfinished baft of the
sort that had been earlier manufactured in Manchester for the Nigerian market
(David Whitehead & Sons 1973). Gordon Hartley, a former employee of David
Figure 2.1 Drawing of Kaduna Textile Ltd, the first industrial textile mill in Kaduna, northern 
Nigeria, which was established in collaboration with the textile manufacturing 
firm, David Whitehead and Sons, Ltd, Rawtenstall, Lancashire, UK (Courtesy of 
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Whitehead & Sons, described the experimental process whereby the right com-
bination of weave and starch led to the desired result (Maiwada and Renne 2013:
176). Mill management and workers successfully produced increasing quantities
of quality baft cotton cloth, which was attractive not only to agents from major
textile firms operating in Nigeria but especially to Nigerian customers.
The early success of Kaduna Textiles Ltd was highlighted in the Kaduna 
Exhibition—“Made in Nigeria,” which opened in May 1959. British colonial 
officials were also anxious to show the positive efforts toward self-governance, 
modernization, and development which KTL represented, in anticipation of 
Nigerian Independence in 1960. This approach, which attempted to negate 
earlier British opposition to industrialization, was reflected in the showcasing 
of Kaduna Textiles Ltd. Nigerian and British political figures, which included 
Ahmadu Bello and Harold Macmillan, as well as many Kaduna residents, 
walked through the exhibit which featured a series of exhibit booths with 
accompanying explanatory panels that illustrated the textile production pro-
cess from cotton field to cotton bales and finally to bales of woven baft cloth 
(Maiwada and Renne 2013: 177). 
Another change which occurred at this time was a shift from the distribution 
of Kaduna Textiles products through trading firm offices in the UK to sales 
through their Nigerian offices, although the control of distribution remained 
in European mercantile hands. However, with Nigerian Independence in 
1960, Kaduna Textile Ltd officials sought to sell bales to independent Nigerian 
traders and merchant houses such as the Kano Merchants Trading Company 
(DanAsabe 2020), which had their own distribution networks (Hartley 2012). 
Kaduna Textiles’ sales to Nigerian traders grew as increased production of new 
products, such as bleached starched shirting, were manufactured in the new 
No. 2 mill which was built in 1960–1961 (Interview: N. Rutherford, 2 March 
2012, Minchinhampton). 
In 1974, the owner of the Northern Nigerian Textile Mill—which special-
ized in printed cotton textiles—was leaving the country. Through a special
arrangement, control of the company was transferred to Kaduna Textiles Ltd
(Maiwada and Renne 2013: 178). Subsequently, two more mills were con-
structed in order to produce additional bleached cotton cloth that was used in
the adjacent Northern Nigerian Textile Mill, with the printed textiles marketed
under the KTL name. This increased production of KTL cloth meant that the
mill needed additional employees—to work in the spinning, weaving, print-
ing, and finishing departments as well as in clerical services and management.
These job openings were filled by men who travelled to Kaduna, having heard
through word of mouth and by radio of employment opportunities there. 
Looking for employment at the Kaduna textile mills: labor 
migration from southern Kaduna and the Middle Belt states 
In 1962, when the second mill was opened in order to provide bleached
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(nd: 4). These numbers increased so that by 1980, it was estimated that KTL
had over 4,000 employees who worked in the mill’s three shifts (Andrae and
Beckman 1999: 301). And, as has been mentioned, many—but not all—of
the workers who came to work at KTL were from towns and villages to the
south of Kaduna whose families had converted to Christianity in early part
of the 20th century. Indeed, three former KTL mill employees who subse-
quently had management positions, Sylvester Gankon, Haruna Joshua, and
the late Shaibu Yusuf, all came from different areas and different ethnic groups
south of Kaduna. Gankon, a Manchok man, came from a town in Kaura Local
Government in southern Kaduna State, and Joshua, an Ngas man, came from
Kamke Local Government in Plateau State—are both Christians. Yusuf, an
Igala man, who came from Ankpa, a town in Ankpa Local Government in
Kogi State, was Muslim. All three came to KTL with some secondary school
education.
Having a secondary school education was relatively unusual during the 
1950s; approximately one in five of the men who came from the south to 
work at Kaduna Textiles Ltd had such an education. However, many work-
ers—about 60%—had attended primary school and thus had elementary read-
ing and writing skills (Andrae and Beckman 1999: 302). These men (or their 
fathers) had acquired basic literacy through the work of evangelist missionar-
ies, particularly those of the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) who fostered the 
building of churches in small villages in southern Kaduna and Plateau states. 
Initially, SIM evangelists were particularly active in Kogi and Niger states, with 
the first SIM station established in Pategi (a Nupe-speaking area in Niger state; 
Ijagbemi 1986). They later continued their proselytizing in villages in areas 
in southern Kaduna state and Plateau state, where they preached in newly-
built churches where reading and writing were also taught. These “Classes for 
Religious Instruction” were an important part of SIM evangelism as the mis-
sion’s education policy made clear: 
The education policy of the Mission in the main recognizes no greater 
responsibility than teaching an illiterate population to read and write so 
that they can use the Holy Scripture for themselves and teach intensively 
those Scriptures. Because the greater bulk of the people in the Central 
Sudan are illiterate, teaching must of necessity go hand-in-hand with 
evangelism. 
(Gaiya 2018: 126) 
Nonetheless, this emphasis on literacy’s importance for SIM evangelism did 
not extend to “subjects such as English, Mathematics, Commercial Arts…and 
other worldly arts and sciences…[as] they become a source of temptation to 
the pupil to enter Government service,” as the SIM evangelist, Dr. Andrew 
Stirrett observed (Gaiya 2018: 126). However, rather than government service, 
this literacy provided men with preparation for work at the Kaduna Textile 
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these men, the possibility of employment in the textile mills in Kaduna was an 
attractive option compared with the tedium of farm work. 
The junior mill manager, Haruna Joshua, came to Kaduna in 1966 from 
Plateau State, as he explains: 
I met my townsmen to join textile mill work in 1967, when I was very 
young, I was 15 years old. It was the year which was the beginning of the 
Nigerian Civil War. I really liked to work in textiles because they were 
weaving some good cloth and I had interest to see the cloth and wondered 
how weaving worked. At that time, it was the British who ran Kaduna 
Textiles. 
We had three shifts A, B, and C, 12 midnight to 8 in the morning, 8am 
to 4pm, then 4pm–12 midnight. I was in the B shift, from 8am–4pm. We 
had a uniform, each shift was a different color so when you saw a col-
league, you knew that this man was from a certain shift. The shift goes 
together with the uniform. But not completely, for some men were iden-
tified by their specific jobs, such as maintenance workers who wore black 
uniforms. (Most of them were on early morning duty.) 
As a weaver, you have to come early, at least ten minutes to the time, 
i.e., the closing time for the earlier shift so that other men going out will 
handover whatever they left off. So, you will take over from where they 
stopped, then you’d carry on. We had clocking cards to keep track of our 
time and we were wearing wristwatches then, in order to know the time. 
I bought it when I started the work. 
During that time, the machines were very good, they were working very 
well so that when a thread broke, the loom would stop automatically so 
that one man could control 20 looms. Then you have a spare workman, 
in case you wanted to go to the toilet, then the spare man will take over, 
otherwise the two of you will be together with 20 machines. 
(Interview: Haruna Joshua, 10 May 2018, Kaduna) 
There are several themes embedded in Haruna Joshua’s description of his
work at Kaduna Textiles Ltd in 1967 that underscore the particularities of his
experience of the transition from agricultural work to industrial capitalism
in Kaduna. First of all, he found his way to the KTL mill through his con-
nections with other Ngas men who preceded him at the mill (LaPin 1983).3 
Second, he began work in the mill in 1967, the year that marked the begin-
ning of the Nigerian civil war, when many older mill workers left to join
the Federal army. This situation, combined with the increasing demand for
textiles by the government, enabled him to join the Kaduna Textiles Ltd
work force when he was only 15 years old. Third, 1967 was also the year
that Ahmadu Bello was assassinated in his home in Kaduna by Igbo military
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not only was Ahmadu Bello an advocate for the industrial and educational
development of northern Nigeria, he was also, as the Sardauna of Sokoto, a
member of the Sokoto royal family and as such, sought to support the pre-
dominance of Islam in northern Nigeria. Indeed, during the early 1960s, he
led what has been referred to as “conversion tours,” in which he travelled
to villages in southern Kaduna in order to counter the work of Christian
missionaries and to support conversion to Islam (Abba 1981). He viewed
the establishment of textile mills in northern Nigeria as a way of providing
Muslim men with increased economic opportunities, just as his support for
the first university in northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello University, was meant
to strengthen northern Nigerians’ opportunities for higher education (Paden
1986). Thus, while the Kaduna Textiles Ltd Handbook explicitly states that,
“It is not the Company’s intention to interfere with the individual employee’s
religious practices,” various concessions to Muslim workers there were made.
For example, “Moslem workers are assured that these [meal] breaks and shift
change times have been agreed by both religious and Government Authorities
who accept that they are so timed as to permit a Moslem to perform his
obligatory prayers” (Kaduna Textiles Ltd nd).
However, the majority of the workers at KTL were Christians, although
there were some Muslim mill workers. Alhaji Shaibu Yusuf, a Muslim origi-
nally from Kogi State, served as a deputy manager at KTL, having attended
Kaduna Polytechnic where he received a Higher National Diploma in
Textile Technology and also in Public Administration. But many Muslim
young men were more likely to receive Islamic, rather than Western, educa-
tion.4 While this situation changed with the opening of Islamic primary and
secondary schools that taught both Islamic and Western education, at that
time young men taught to read and write in mission schools to the south
had an advantage. For reading and writing were essential prerequisites for
employment at the KTL mill. As one man put it, “KTL at that time, it was
a nice textile mill, everyone liked to work at KTL,” but not everyone was
hired.5 
Getting a job at Kaduna Textiles Ltd 
Men working as farmers in villages throughout southern Kaduna State and 
the Middle Belt region heard about work opportunities at the textile mills in 
Kaduna by various means. Some were encouraged to come by family members 
or fellow villagers already working at one of the mills. Others heard about job 
openings at the Kaduna textile mills through radio broadcasts. Some, having 
completed their primary education in the village, came to seek employment in 
the big city on their own initiative: 
I finished my school in 1968 and came to Kaduna. I heard that they were 
looking for people who can work in Kaduna. Most companies used to 
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radio and some we heard from people who came back to their village. 
When they came back, they said we could find a job either sweeping or 
working in an office.That was how I came to Kaduna and I stayed with 
my brother. 
(Interview: Wuyah Adze, 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
Once in Kaduna, they sought out work, often with the assistance of family 
members already living in the city. The first step in seeking employment at 
textile mills such as KTL was to apply for work at the government labor office: 
At the labor office, we had to make a queue…From there, they selected me 
to go to KTL. When I got there, they sent me to the Weaving Department, 
that department was good for me. That was how I was appointed to KTL. 
When I went to the KTL factory, they interviewed us. We went to their 
office one by one for the interview. That time the personnel manager was 
the senior brother of the Governor of Plateau state, J.D. Gowon. He was 
the one who interviewed me. First of all, he looked at your hands and if 
they are rough, he will say you cannot work because you will be working 
with cotton. The man was very intelligent. 
(Interview: Haruna Joshua, 16 July 2019, Kaduna) 
There was also an effort made to equitably hire workers by ethnicity and by 
their cultural embeddedness, as Haruna Joshua explained: 
The Idoma were the greatest number among the 30 people there, they 
were 18 out of the 30. The personnel manager told his personal assistant 
to move the chairs out of the room. Then he said that all the Idoma should 
come. He told them to dance the way that they danced in their home-
towns. One of them was singing their song and the rest answered. They 
were asked to go one way in a line—those who were not living in their 
hometowns but were living in Kaduna town [barriki], they could not do 
the dance, so they were knocking into each other. The manager then said, 
“Those who could not dance among them, they could not do the work in 
the factory so they should go.” 
That was how he selected the Idoma. He then turned to us—those
who were not Idoma—and asked us to bring our primary school certifi-
cates. He saw where I came from. His father was a tax collector in my
own village, AmKyar, we called him Mr. Achi. The personnel manager
said he knew my father. I was happy that he knew my father because I
knew I would be hired. He asked me a question, he said, “If you are going
to Jos and you drop one person at Saminaka, two stop at another place,
etc.—I answered correctly…So that is how he employed me. Because he
realized that I answered the question correctly and that my hands were
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We who were selected, they gave us some forms, the rules and regula-
tions of the factory were written on it. Some things written on the form: 
“If you fight with each other you will be sacked; if you steal from the 
company you will be sacked; if you are absent for 3 days, you will also be 
sacked.” We were asked to sign the form that we agreed with the rules and 
regulations of the factory and that we will obey them. 
(Interview: Haruna Joshua, 16 July 2019, Kaduna) 
However, one Idoma man, Godwin Okwoli, had a somewhat different 
experience: 
The employment was conducted by province with your certificate at that
time. The procedure was that the KTL personnel manager would look at
your school certificate. At the front gate they would call us by province and
through that province, they kept some, then after Lokoja Province, then
Benue Province, then to Kaduna. So, after that, based on the number of peo-
ple that they needed they would recruit almost 20. Not all 20 from Benue
alone, they selected 3 or 4 from Benue. They selected workers based on your
certificate, they then removed you from the major line and put you in another
line. There were some who didn’t finish primary 7, they weren’t selected.
(Interview: 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
Once a worker had been approved to work at KTL by the personnel manager, 
he was sent to the clinic for a health check-up. If he passed muster, he was sent 
to a particular department to begin work, as Bulus Ayuba explained: 
I was employed and sent to the Operations Department. There was a trial 
period of about 2 months to see if you will be able to do the job. Then 
they will give you a permanent position and they gave me my name tag— 
and they would also give you a number. I still remember my number, it 
was 1068 at that time. 
(Interview: Bulus Ayuba, 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
This trial period was varied based on the workers’ abilities and the company’s
needs. Depending on the position and type of work, workers were sent for fur-
ther training at the workshop in the mill itself and others were sent to Kaduna
Polytechnic and other schools in the Kaduna area. Depending on the course of
training, some workers attended school for a year, others for several years, as
Samson Okwoli explained: “Then they sent me to Kaduna Polytechnic where I
spent five years, learning textile science and management, I have the certificate.” 
As Thompson (1967: 84) has noted, schools contributed to new ways of 
thinking about time regimes: 
One other non-industrial institution lay to hand which might be used to 
inculcate “time-thrift”: the school. Clayton complained that the streets of 
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Manchester were full of “idle ragged children; who are not only losing 
their Time, but learning habits of gaming”, etc. He praised charity schools 
for teaching Industry, Frugality, Order and Regularity: “the Scholars here 
are obliged to rise betimes and to observe Hours, with great Punctuality.” 
In some ways, discipline in the Methodist schools—both in Nigeria and 
England—conditioned children, some of whom became textile mill workers, 
to follow school rules, to be obedient, and to be “on time”: “Once within the 
school gates, the child entered the new universe of disciplined time…The first 
rule to be learned by the scholars was: ‘I am to be present at the School…a few 
minutes before half-past nine o’clock’” (Thompson 1967: 84).6 
By the early 1900s, these ways of thinking about time were well inculcated 
in the minds and behavior of British missionaries who came to Nigeria to 
teach children in SIM and Methodist schools, and were learned by children 
who attended them. These ways of thinking about time and work—that one 
must work hard, be punctual, and not waste time—also framed the company 
requirements and were accepted by those who were hired to work at the 
Kaduna Textiles Ltd mill. 
Kaduna Textiles Ltd: new regimes of work and time 
The Company therefore aims at recruiting, training and retaining a body 
of employees who are efficient in their work and enabling each employee 
to make to this joint effort the fullest contribution of which he is capable. 
Kaduna Textile Ltd Employee’s Handbook 
In order to operate the mill equipment efficiently, workers and section heads 
needed training that was provided through various methods of instruction—at 
the KTL mill itself, through attendance at local schools, and through on-the-
job training. They also needed to be efficient with their use of time for, as 
Godwin Okwoli observed, “Those days, time was very scarce.” 
As with other workers, Okwoli became familiar with the mill’s regimen of 
time, which included the use of sirens that marked shift changes, the wearing 
of wristwatches, and the use of clocking cards, as one KTL junior mill man-
ager, Haruna Joshua, explained: “We were given clocking cards—so if you 
were late, it would show the time you clocked in so it was better that you came 
to clock in earlier than to be late.” Wuyah Adze described his own beginning 
work experience of mill time: 
You know when you are newly employed, they will put you in the morn-
ing section. Sometimes we used to start work at 7 am. I used to know the 
time when the rooster crowed. Honestly, I would get up because I had to 
trek from Tudun Nupawa and I would follow long the Kaduna Bridge to 
come to work. Early in the morning we would trek to come to the mill 
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but later they introduced clocking cards—so you would clock in and clock 
out. That was how we knew the time. 
(Interview: 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
These comments exemplify what E.P. Thompson has observed about new 
conceptions of time as money associated with industrial capitalism. 
The specifics of time and work requirements were provided in the KTL 
Employee’s Handbook regarding “Hours and Conditions of Work,” for shift and 
non-shift workers (Figure 2.2). As Haruna Joshua, recalled, there were incen-
tives and alarms to encourage workers to keep to time: 
In the olden days, when you resume by 12 noon they will be showing 
films in the Welfare Centre so you will come early and you won’t be 
late…We enjoyed the films before lunch-time, then when it was ten min-
utes to lunch time, they would blow the alarm and the whole of Kakuri 
will hear the alarm, that it’s now 10 minutes to 12 noon. So even if you 
are asleep, you will wake up and wash your face and come at that time, ten 
minutes to twelve to take over for the out-going person. 
(Interview: 10 May 2018, Kaduna) 
Nonetheless, some workers did come late. They were required to get permis-
sion from their supervisor to begin work and unless “permission is given or a 
good cause shown, disciplinary action may be taken by the employer” (Kaduna 
Textiles Ltd nd). 
Men were proud to keep to time by wall clocks, alarms clocks, and even 
wristwatches (Figure 2.3). When asked when he first had a wristwatch, Wuzah 
Adze exclaimed: 
I couldn’t afford a watch then [in the village], we were even using salt sacks
to make short pants for school. How could I wear a wristwatch at that time?
Figure 2.2 Kaduna Textiles Limited Employee’s Handbook with motto: “WORK, 
HONESTY, OBEDIENCE,” undated, Kaduna (Photograph by E.P. Renne, 
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Figure 2.3 Weaving room workers at Kaduna Textile Ltd, note wristwatch worn by worker 
on the right (Courtesy of David Whitehead and Sons, Ltd, Archives, Parbold, 
Lancashire, UK). 
I started wearing a wristwatch in 1970 when I was working at KTL. Then
I would say that I was an “oga” when I started wearing that wristwatch.7 
(Interview: 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
When Godwin Okwoli first started to work at KTL in 1963, wristwatches 
were not common. However, they became readily available by the 1970s in 
Kaduna with traders selling them in front of the KTL entry gate, as Reuben 
Yakubu explained: “Those wristwatches, some fellows, they used to sell them 
on credit to us. When we got our pay, we would give them their money, N20 
or N30, for some of them” (Interview: 24 July 2019, Kaduna). 
Some workers also had purchased wall clocks in order to arrive at the mill 
on time: 
We had a wall clock and set the alarm in our house. They—the managers 
didn’t give them to us, we bought them. We’d set the alarm and come to 
work. At the time of closing, the company would tell us. 
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These means of keeping to time differed from village time-keeping, as Samson 
Okwoli, a former KTL worker, observed: 
Initially I started work at KTL at 8pm. Since I knew that I would resume
work at 8pm, I would have to get there earlier. My alarm clock would tell
me the time and they have an alarm clock here at the mill. I had a wrist-
watch then too. But in the village, we used to farm. Everyday we would
get up, we would use the sun to know the time, whether it is rising or
it is setting—then they would know it was evening, after doing a day of
farming. 
(Interview: Samson Okwoli, 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
Yet some men who came from villages in southern Kaduna State were quite 
familiar with clocks from their attendance at school, as Bulus Ayuba said: 
In our own village, you know, many people had already gone to school
and had an education so they had wall clocks. Because at that time, we had
already grown up, education had gone on. But our people in the olden
days, they kept local time by the light [sun]. So when they said it was 10
o’clock and you looked at the wall clock, it said 10 o’clock exactly. So
early in the morning they would say it was time to go to school. When
it is morning time, they would know it’s almost 6 o’clock, 7 o’clock and
then you will know it’s 10-11am as that was the time the Fulani people
are selling fura and grazing their animals because they know the time.
(Interview: 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
This shift from assessing time based on the sun—daytime—or its absence— 
nighttime, as well as time based on tasks—selling fura—to time based on time-
pieces—such as wall clocks, wristwatches, and alarm clocks—was reinforced 
by KTL managers, who devised a system of incentives to motivate superior 
workers who kept to time. 
KTL work incentives 
There were several incentives which encouraged employees to work hard and 
to stay with the company. Several workers received certificates of long service 
for 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and even 40 years of service. While cloth wrap-
pers (six-yard pieces of KTL fabric) and, for some, money, were given along 
with the certificates, the ten-year long service award was particularly special, as 
Godwin Okwoli explained: 
They sent your name to the Department, after ten years they give you 
wrappers and a wall clock, 10 year service award, after 15 years and then 
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clock but the clock only once. The wrapper number depended on your 
grade, the last one I collected 6 pieces of wrapper cloth for 20 years of 
service. 
(Interview: 24 July 2019, Kaduna) 
According to Haruna Joshua, “I was given a certificate after 10 years, after
25 years, and 30 years… They gave us six cloth wrappers and money—we
enjoyed ourselves!” Cloth wrappers (six-yard pieces) were also given at spe-
cial holidays such as Christmas and Ramadan.8 There was also a company
clinic (as will be discussed in the Chapter 3) which attended to workers’ and
their immediate family members’ health problems. If the problem was serious,
the worker was transferred to a local hospital with expenses covered by the
company. In addition, a canteen located at the mill provided subsidized meals
prepared by local women, while films were regularly shown at the Welfare
Centre located on the KTL site. KTL also provided housing in the Barnawa
[Birnawa] area for junior staff members, some of whose widows continue to
live there. 
In all these ways—by the division of labour, the supervision of labour; 
fines; bells and clocks; money incentives; preachings and schooling; the 
suppression of fairs and sports – new labour habits were formed, and a new 
time-discipline was imposed. 
(Thompson 1967: 90) 
For those who were hired, many stayed on despite increasing difficulties for 
workers, union organizers, and management alike (Andrae and Beckman 1999: 
106). 
Signs of distress and the mill’s closure 
What needs to be said is not that one way of life is better than the other, 
but that this is a place of the most far-reaching conflict; that the historical 
record is not a simple one of neutral and inevitable/technological change, 
but is also one of exploitation and of resistance to exploitation; and that 
values stand to be lost as well as gained. 
(Thompson 1967: 93–94) 
The textile mills in Kaduna were still operating in the 1990s although they 
were operating with obsolete equipment, without the capital to obtain spare 
parts, and without a regular source of electricity. In 1997, the Kaduna Textiles 
Ltd mill was “on the verge of collapse” (Onyeiwu 1997: 244). The subse-
quent closing of Kaduna Textiles Ltd and other textile mills in Kaduna partly 
reflected the fall in international oil prices in the early 1980s (Andrae and 
Beckman 1999: 38). This situation contributed to a reduction of government 
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Adjustment Program (SAP), signed by former President Ibrahim Babangida in 
1986 and implemented in 1987, led to the subsequent currency devaluation 
which contributed to the process of decline for the Kaduna Textiles Ltd mill. 
One oft-cited reason for the mills’ decline was that outdated textile equipment 
was neither repaired nor replaced because the foreign exchange needed to pur-
chase spare parts and new equipment was not available. Yet even if spinning 
machines, winders, and looms had been replaced, they became prohibitively 
expensive to operate due to the irregular supply of electricity and the need 
to use “black oil” as a source of power for textile mills in Kaduna. This situ-
ation was one of the main reasons for mill closures cited in the literature, in 
newspaper articles, and by textile workers alike. The economic constraints on 
textile mill production due to the lack of electricity in Kaduna had a variety of 
consequences for textile mill workers. 
At the Kaduna Textiles Ltd mill, the lack of working equipment led to
temporary shut-downs and stoppages (Onyeiwu 1997: 244–245). These
shut-downs and production stoppages affected mill managers’ ability to
pay workers in a timely fashion and led to periods of compulsory leave.
In January 1984, KTL workers were given the option of closing the mill
altogether or taking a 50% reduction in pay, a situation which led to a labor
protest (Andrae and Beckman 1999: 15–17). After a settlement agreement
the following month that reinstated all workers with a 25% pay reduction,
the mill continued operations although the work force was reduced, not by
dismissals but by attrition. After 1984, a new manager was put in place who
streamlined production by closing the third and fourth mills, by refurbish-
ing equipment through salvaging spare parts from decommissioned machin-
ery, and by putting fewer workers in charge of more machines (Andrae and
Beckman 1999: 104). While these actions improved production and even
led to a slight profit in 1986, inefficiencies of production and relatively high
prices of KTL products led to their lack of competitiveness, in part reflecting
industrial attrition associated with Abacha regime corruption (Andrae and
Beckman 1999: 286).9 
New and different regimes of time 
By 2002, the KTL mill had closed. After the closure of this mill and other mills 
in Kaduna, the equation of “time is money” associated with industrial capital-
ism collapsed as former KTL workers, dismissed without gratuity payments, 
had abundant but purposeless time. Several widows mentioned their husbands’ 
frustration with their failure to receive their benefits and their worries about 
supporting their families. For example, Audu Kuru, who worked in the KTL 
Spinning Department, was consumed with worries about obtaining his gratuity 
payment, which his widow believed led to his death: 
The problem he faced, he was always thinking—he didn’t receive his gra-
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his eyes would become red. Besides that, he came to discover that he had 
ciwo suga [diabetes] before he died. 
(Interview: Asabe Audu, 9 May 2018, Kaduna) 
Other former KTL workers became disoriented and, as one widow put it, her 
husband, Ayuba Dandume, “lost his mind”: 
After he lost his job, he started work as a security man…There was a time 
he spent two days—we didn’t see him, he was just walking around Abuja 
Road. We found him and brought him back home. He was suffering from 
that time until the time when he couldn’t speak or move…Even his food, 
I had to feed him because he could not feed himself—because he could 
not lift his arms. He suffered for three years. We took him to St. Gerard’s 
Hospital and [after he died], we buried him in this house. 
(Interview: Cecilia Ayuba, 9 May 2018, Kaduna) 
For many KTL workers who abided by the company’s rules about being “on
time”—coming early, clocking in and out using clocking cards, and promptly
resuming work after breaks, time was money. And even though pay for most
workers was not great, food prices were low in Kaduna in the 1960s and 1970s
so that the money they earned was associated with abundant food. “We even
threw food away,” as one widow recalled. However, after the KTL mill closed
and workers were discharged without their gratuities and could not find other
jobs, they not only had “time on their hands,” but many were unable to buy
sufficient food for their families. While several former workers (and their wives)
resorted to farming, in many cases returning to one’s hometown was not a
realistic option. For it was not only workers, and later, their widows, who had
come to Kaduna and had become accustomed to urban life, which was the case
for many of their children who were born in the city. It was also the fractur-
ing of extended family ties, reinforced by the regimented hours and regular
income associated with industrial employment, as opposed to the hours which
fluctuated with the seasons; the hard, physical labor associated with farming; and
the intimate sociality of village life. This disjunction of family connections was
reflected in the experiences of some widows and their children on returning
to their hometown after their husbands’ and fathers’ deaths, as one daughter
explained: 
We didn’t find it easy when my father died…We went back to our
hometown, but the way they have been there, it’s not easy because my 
mother was staying with the wives of my father’s brother—they were gos-
siping about her and insulting her. So my mother said that she couldn’t 
stay there and brought us back here to Kaduna. I don’t think that we will 
go back home in the future although we used to go from time to time. 
But there has been no help from our relatives, not even N5 up until now. 
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This lack of social or financial support, faced by some but not all KTL widows 
and their children, underscores their very different experience of post-capitalist 
industrial time in Kaduna, Nigeria. 
Conclusion 
Kaduna Textiles Ltd provides a particular example of the growth of indus-
trial capitalism in a specific sociocultural, economic, and political context;
the KTL mill was opened as a government initiative, with assistance from a
private foreign textile firm. Through the opening of the Kaduna Textiles Ltd
mill Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern Region, was determined
to develop the economy of the North and, furthermore, to increase Muslim
conversion in southern Kaduna and Middle Belt states. Yet as one Middle
Belt mill worker, Pa Afolabi, observed: “we were always saying that [the]
late Sardauna was a Northerner by origin but a Nigerian by action because
all he did was for the benefit of all irrespective of place of origin” (Mudashir
2010). While the particular history that preceded this situation—particularly
the 19th century control of much of northern Nigeria by Muslim rulers asso-
ciated with the Sokoto Caliphate and the subsequent imposition of British
colonial rule in the early 20th century—is beyond the scope of this volume,10 
this history affected the political inclination of those belonging to the many
small ethnic groups in southern Kaduna and Middle Belt states. Their dis-
tasteful memories of northern emirate rule and the associated practice of
slavery contributed to their acceptance of the British and Christian mission-
aries who taught them to read the Bible, which inadvertently contributed to
labor migration to Kaduna and affected who was hired by Kaduna Textiles
Ltd managers.
Thus, while the outcome of this industrialization process reflects the par-
ticularities of northern Nigerian history and culture, one might also say that the 
deindustrialization of the textile mills in Kaduna is also specific to the Nigerian 
context. For example, unlike Nigeria, most of the cotton textile mills in the 
UK ended production in the late 20th century (BBC National Films 2014; 
Blackburn 1993; Famie and Jeremy 2004), largely due to insufficient labor. 
But, as in Nigeria, their demise was also due to reduced production capacity 
and foreign competition.11 As Blackburn (1993: 256–257) observed regarding 
the cotton textile industry in the UK: 
At the end of 1991, there were a derisory 460,000 spindles in place (com-
pared with 9 million in 1961) and 8,700 looms (as against 168,000 in 
1961)…On the evidence of the capacity figures mentioned it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the UK no longer has a cotton textile industry of 
any consequence. 
This decline in spinning and weaving capacity reflected the closing of many 
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the BBC National Film production, “From Boom to Bust: The Decline of the 
Cotton Industry”: 
During the 1960s and 70s, mills were closed across Lancashire at a rate of 
almost one a week. By the 1980s the textile industry of the North West 
had all but vanished. Only the empty factories and northern towns which 
sprung up as a result, were left—a legacy of an industry that was once the 
pride of Britain. 
This situation has been difficult for many former UK textile mill workers. Yet 
other employment opportunities, particularly for those with higher education, 
along with government programs that provided unemployment support and 
health care lessened the impact of this transition in the UK. 
While the Kaduna Textiles Ltd mill was built and equipped by a British 
textile manufacturing firm, David Whitehead & Sons Ltd, Nigerian textile 
mill workers experienced a different situation after the KTL mill had closed in 
Kaduna as compared to that of British textile mill workers. With the ownership 
of KTL continuing to be held in trust by the 19 northern state governments, an 
agreement on final remittance payments has not been reached despite union, 
coalition, and worker efforts, nor has health care been provided by KTL or the 
state government. Thus, despite KTL workers’ acceptance of the new work 
and time regime, this particular form of industrial state-owned, “public capital-
ism,” has led to their forced acceptance of either a return to agricultural labor 
with its time-regimen based on the seasons or of “free time,” during which 
they are unemployed but hardly at their leisure. For those preferring to remain 
in the city, the difficulties of living there without regular income and access 
to affordable health care has contributed to the many health problems experi-
enced by former KTL workers and the subsequent deaths of many. The health 
problems associated with their work at the KTL mill and their deaths after the 
mill’s closure are explored in the following chapter. 
Notes 
1 The opening of Kaduna Textiles Ltd was reported in newspapers from three continents: 
the Chicago Defender, Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, the Manchester Guardian, The Times (London), 
and the Washington Afro-American. 
2 Following World War II, the Department of Development and Welfare established Textile
Training Centres to encourage floor loom handweaving in Nigeria and to provide employ-
ment for returning soldiers However, knowledge of handweaving was hardly preparation
for using industrial looms and associated carding, spinning, dyeing, and finishing equip-
ment nor were most veterans interested in handweaving as an occupation (Renne 1997). 
3 This connection resembles the “sibling chain of assistance,” described by demographers 
in explaining family strategies that enabled the education of younger children through 
the work of older, educated children (Caldwell 1977: 20). 
4 Of the 100 KTL mill workers interviewed by Andrae and Beckman in 1987, only 8% 
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5 This man later went to work at Arewa Textiles, another textile mill in Kaduna (Interview: 
Johannes Kukah, 28 February 2012, Kaduna). 
6 Thompson (1967: 86) cites the remark of a Gloucester UK hemp and flax [spinning] 
thread manufacturer in 1786 regarding the effects of schools on his workers: “They… 
become more tractable and obedient, and less quarrelsome and revengeful.” 
7 As Thompson (1967: 69) notes, during the 1800s in England: “The small instrument 
which regulated the new rhythms of industrial life was at the same time one of the more 
urgent of the new needs which industrial capitalism called forth to energize its advance. 
A clock or a watch was not only useful; it conferred prestige upon its owner, and a man 
might be willing to stretch his resources to get one.” 
8 One widow mentioned that her husband would sell the KTL cloths and purchase more 
costly cloths for her with the proceeds (Interview: Saidi Ishaya, 15 May 2018, Kaduna). 
9 Funds for the textile industry and other government programs were syphoned off by the 
Abacha family and deposited in overseas accounts. In 2005, $752 million dollars (US) 
were recovered from a Swiss bank account, as was $322.5 million dollars (US) in 2017. 
An agreement for the release of an additional $308 million dollars (US) held in an Isle of 
Jersey account has recently been settled. In the past, recovered funds have been used for 
infrastructure and cash transfers to the poor (Azu 2019).The $308 million dollar settle-
ment will be used for road and rail projects (Odeyemi 2020). 
10 There are several sources that document the history of the Sokoto Caliphate and Emirate 
rule in northern Nigeria and the Middle Belt states which include: Kani and Gandi 
(1990); Last (1967); Lovejoy (1978); and Philips (1992). 
11 The British wool textile industry also followed a downward trajectory: “Despite the 
efforts made by the industry, trade unions and government,…by the end of 1978 there 
were only 54,755 wool textile workers left in Britain.The industry was never to recover” 
(Price 2014: 44; see also Jenkins 1972). 
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